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Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 
Defendant: 
The Case for a Unified Federal 
Copyright System for Sound 
Recordings 
 
Brian G. Shaffer* 
 
I. Introduction: A (Hazy) Dual System of Copyright  
Protection 
 
February 15, 1972 is a landmark date in the history of 
copyright protection for sound recordings in the United States.  
In response to a growing movement toward criminalizing music 
“piracy,” Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1909 to include 
“sound recordings” under the wing of federal protection.1  
Congress, however, extended copyright protection to sound 
recordings only prospectively; thus, all recordings created before 
February 15, 1972, the effective date of the 1971 amendments, 
were left outside the scope of the Copyright Act.2  Pre-1972 
sound recordings have consequently been protected by a variety 
of property protections at the state level, creating a legal 
standard that “is inconsistent from state to state, often vague, 
and sometimes difficult to discern.”3 
The inconsistency in copyright protection may serve as an 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Pace University School of Law. 
1. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 260 (N.Y. 
2005).  The Naxos case is considered the “most notable case in recent years 
involving pre-1972 sound recordings.”  Michael I. Rudell & Neil J. Rosini, Pre-
1972 Sound Recordings-A Legal Breed Apart, 250-82 N.Y. L.J., Oct. 25, 2013, 
at 3 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR 
PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS (2011), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf). 
2. Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 260. 
3. Rudell & Rosini, supra note 1. 
1
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incentive for radio services to maximize profits by reducing or 
eliminating royalty payments related to pre-1972 recordings.  
Sirius XM, which serves some 25 million subscribers, is 
currently the only satellite radio provider in the United States.4  
In 2012, “the company had $3.4 billion in revenue and paid 8 
percent of its gross revenue in royalties to record companies and 
performers, according to its annual report.”5  Over a period of 
five weeks, different plaintiffs filed three separate lawsuits 
naming Sirius XM as defendant, alleging improper use of sound 
recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972.6  Two of the lawsuits 
were filed in California,7 a state with a long history of protecting 
artists’ property rights to pre-1972 sound recordings.8  A third 
lawsuit, however, filed in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, set out causes of action based in federal 
laws and regulations regarding copyrights and payment of 
royalties.9 
This article observes the surviving gap between state and 
federal protection of music recordings through the lens of the 
current litigation against Sirius XM.  Part II sets out a history 
of copyright protection in the music industry.  Part III outlines 
the relevant provisions of the federal Copyright Act and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the role played in the 
federal system by the Copyright Royalty Board.  Part IV 
examines the pertinent statutory property protection of music 
recordings in the state of California.  Part V then discusses the 
merits of the current lawsuits against Sirius XM.  After 
 
4. Ben Sisario, Record Labels Sue Sirius XM Over the Use of Older Music, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, at B4. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. BC520981 (Cal. 
Super. filed Sept. 11, 2013); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 
2:13CV05693 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 6, 2013).  Plaintiffs in the latter case have 
applied for class action status, see Sisario, supra note 4, and their claims are 
addressed in this paper only insofar as they may impact the treatment of the 
plaintiffs’ claims in the Capitol Records case. 
8. See Complaint ¶ 1, Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 
BC520981 (Cal. Super. filed Sept. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Capital Records v. 
Sirius XM Complaint] (“For over 40 years, sound recordings have been 
protected by California common law, and for over 30 years they have been 
provided protection under Section 980 of the California Civil Code.”). 
9. SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290 
(D.D.C. filed Aug. 26, 2013). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
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considering the potential legal and economic ramifications of the 
current lawsuits, Part VI then concludes by advocating for a 
unified federal system of copyright protection for all sound 
recordings regardless of the date on which they were originally 
fixed. 
 
II. A History of Copyright Protection in the Music Industry 
 
Prior to the 20th century, when the music recording 
industry began to take a commercial foothold, the seminal 
copyright law case in the United States was Wheaton v. Peters, 
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), in which the plaintiff, an official 
reporter for the U.S. Supreme Court, sought “to prevent his 
successor from copying and republishing material contained in 
the volumes published by the first three official reporters.”10  In 
a thorough discussion of the history of American copyright law, 
the Court of Appeals of New York noted that “[t]he lasting effect 
of the Wheaton decision was that it ‘became accepted, and in 
most cases unquestioned, doctrine that . . . it was the act of 
publication which divested common law rights.’”11  Since 
copyright statutes were “created with sole reference to the 
written word,” however, the issue of how to apply such statutes 
to music was left unresolved until the early 1900’s.12 
The United States Supreme Court first passed upon the 
issue of the federal Copyright Act’s application to forms of 
communication other than the written word in 1908.13  
“Although acknowledging that the federal statute had been 
amended as far back as 1831 to include ‘musical composition[s],’ 
the Court believed that only written works that could be ‘see[n] 
and read’ met the requirement for filing with the Library of 
Congress—a prerequisite to securing federal copyright 
protection.”14  Congress at this time had begun to revise the 
 
10. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 257 (N.Y. 
2005) (citation omitted); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).  
A great deal of thanks is owed to the Court of Appeals of New York, whose 
outline of the history of American copyright law in the Naxos case is both 
extensive and informative. 
11. Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 257-58 (citation omitted). 
12. Id. at 258. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. (quoting White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 
3
   
2015 SIRIUS XM RADIO, INC., DEFENDANT 1019 
copyright statutes “but decided to wait for the Supreme Court’s 
decision.”15  Once this decision was handed down, Congress 
passed the Copyright Act of 1909, which reflected the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in White-Smith by excluding audio recordings, 
which could not be “published,” from federal copyright 
protection.16  In section 2 of the 1909 Act, however, “Congress 
explicitly stated that the Act ‘shall [not] be construed to annul 
or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished 
work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, 
publication, or use of such unpublished work without his 
consent, and to obtain damages therefor,’” thus preserving 
states’ power to offer common-law copyright protection to 
unpublished sound recordings.17 
Following Congress’ affirmation of this “dual system of 
copyright protection[,]” the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
ruled that phonograph recordings of an orchestra’s 
performances were entitled to state common-law protection, 
stating “that a performer who transforms a musical composition 
into a sound product creates ‘something of novel intellectual or 
artistic value [and] has undoubtedly participated in the creation 
of a product in which he is entitled to a right of property.’”18  The 
court further held that “the sale of records was not a publication 
of the work that operated to divest the orchestra of its common-
law property right . . .[,]”19 a position echoed by the Supreme 
Court of New York, New York County, more than a decade 
later.20  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit subsequently reconsidered an earlier decision in which it 
held that “the sale of a record to the public . . . ends common-law 
copyright protection[,]”21 stating that the act of putting “records 
 
17 (1908)). 
15. Id. at 258 n.6. 
16. Id. at 258. 
17. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 2 (repealed 1978)). 
18. Id. at 258-59 (quoting Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, 194 A. 631, 
635 (Pa. 1937)). 
19. Id. at 259. 
20. Id. (quoting Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 
101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 494 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (“At common law the public performance 
of a play, exhibition of a picture or sale of a copy of the film for public 
presentation did not constitute an abandonment nor deprive the owner of his 
common-law rights.”)). 
21. Id. (citing RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940)). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
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on public sale . . . does not constitute a dedication of the right to 
copy and sell the records.”22 
When Congress, in response to unrest among the states in 
their attempts to combat the growing ease of unlawful 
reproduction of recordings, amended the Copyright Act of 1909, 
sound recordings for the first time were included among the 
categories of works protected by federal law, excluding those 
created before the effective date of the amendment (February 15, 
1972).23  In passing this amendment, the Senate and the House 
of Representatives “eventually reached a compromise, deciding 
that existing state common-law copyright protection for pre-
1972 recordings would not be preempted by the new federal 
statute until . . . 75 years after the effective date of the 1971 
amendment.”24  The new amendment presented the music 
industry with new challenges, including “uncertainty as to how 
claims of copyright infringement would be treated in different 
jurisdictions” and “concern that the amendments could be read 
as abrogating existing state statutes proscribing music piracy,” 
as well as the fact that the amendment failed to “include a 
technical definition of the term ‘publication,’ which clouded the 
meaning of that term of art in the recording industry.”25 
The challenges presented by the 1971 amendments were 
first addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).  In upholding 
California’s music piracy statute against an assertion that the 
state law conflicted with and was therefore preempted by the 
Copyright Act, the Court: 
 
acknowledged that the states were free to act with 
regard to sound recordings precisely because 
Congress had not, and in the absence of conflict 
between federal and state law, the Supremacy 
Clause was not a barrier to a state’s provision of 
copyright protection to a work not covered under 
 
22. Id. at 260 (quoting Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 
657, 663 (2d Cir. 1955)). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 260-61 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012)). 
25. Id. at 261. 
5
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federal copyright law.26 
 
As noted by the Court of Appeals of New York in Naxos, 
 
The effect of Goldstein was more than an 
affirmation of the states’ right to enact criminal 
laws prohibiting music piracy.  Its rationale 
clearly deviated from the Wheaton view—that 
publication divests common-law rights even in the 
absence of statutory protection.  Instead, the 
Court relied on the rule that state common-law 
copyright protection can continue beyond the 
technical definition of publication in the absence 
of contrary statutory authority.27 
 
Further revision of the Copyright Act went into effect in 1978, 
this time including a definition of “publication,”28 but still 
applying only prospectively and thus “continuing to exclude pre-
1972 recordings from the scope of the statute” and again leaving 
“to the states the decision how to handle the meaning and effect 
of ‘publication’ for pre-1972 sound recordings.”29 
After a long string of apparent victories for state-law-based 
rights, the music industry suffered a temporary setback when 
the Ninth Circuit ruled in 1995 that “public sale of a pre-1972 
sound recording is a publication that divests the owner of 
common-law copyright protection[,]” directly conflicting with the 
 
26. Id. (citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569-70 (1973)). 
27. Id. at 261-62 (citing 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.02(c), at 4-17 n.23). 
28. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  This section of the Copyright Act reads, in 
relevant part: 
 
“Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of 
a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or 
by rental, lease, or lending.  The offering to distribute copies 
or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further 
distribution, public performance, public display, constitutes 
publication.  A public performance or display of a work does 
not of itself constitute publication. 
 
Id. 
29. Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 262 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
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rationale adopted in earlier cases by the Second Circuit.30  This 
divergent view was met with criticism in Congress, which 
subsequently amended the Copyright Act “to clarify that ‘[t]he 
distribution before January 1, 1978, of a phonorecord shall not 
for any purpose constitute a publication of the musical work 
embodied therein.’”31  The Ninth Circuit then “acknowledged 
that the intent of Congress was to ‘restore national uniformity 
on this important issue by confirming the wisdom of the custom 
and usage of the affected industries and of the Copyright Office 
for nearly 100 years.’”32 
After laying out its detailed history of American copyright 
law, the Court of Appeals of New York turned to the certified 
questions presented to it in Naxos.  Before answering three 
questions certified to it by the Second Circuit, the court noted 
that, in contrast to the general rule regarding literary works 
that publication terminates common-law protection: 
 
in the realm of sound recordings, it has been the 
law in this state for over 50 years that, in the 
absence of federal statutory protection, the public 
sale of a sound recording otherwise unprotected 
by statutory copyright does not constitute a 
publication sufficient to divest the owner of 
common-law copyright protection.33 
 
The thorough and reasoned opinion of the Court of Appeals 
faithfully tracks the history of state copyright protection of 
sound recordings and contributes substantially to the 
foundation upon which this article develops the position that the 
current litigation against Sirius XM is not without merit and 
that Congress should, in the interest of preventing future 
uncertainty, amend the Copyright Act to extend federal 
copyright protection to all sound recordings regardless of the 
date on which they were fixed. 
 
30. Id. (citing La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 
1995)). 
31. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2012)). 
32. Id. (quoting ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 
2000) (quoting 143 Cong. Rec. S11301 (statement of Sen. Hatch)). 
33. Id. at 264 (citations omitted). 
7
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III. Federal Protections: The Copyright Act, Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, and the Copyright Royalty Board 
 
A. The Copyright Act, Title 17 of the United States Code 
 
The Copyright Act distinguishes between a “musical work” 
and a “sound recording.”34  A musical work includes a 
transcribed musical arrangement as well as “any accompanying 
words.”35  A sound recording is a work “that result[s] from the 
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not 
including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material 
objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which 
they are embodied.”36  As noted by the Court of Appeals of New 
York, sound recordings were first brought under the wing of 
federal copyright protection in the 1971 amendment to the 
Copyright Act, effective February 15, 1972.37 
The Copyright Act preempts all state laws pertaining to 
rights within the general scope of copyright.38  The Act does not, 
 
34. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).  This section of the Copyright Act reads, in 
relevant part: 
 
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this 
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.  Works of authorship include the following categories: 
. . . 
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; . . . 
(7) sound recordings; . . . 
 
Id. 
35. Id. § 102(a)(2). 
36. Id. § 101. 
37. See Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 260. 
38. 17 U.S.C. § 301.  This section of the Copyright Act reads, in relevant 
part: 
 
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal and equitable 
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
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however, extend its preemptive powers to state statutory and 
common-law rights in sound recordings fixed prior to February 
15, 1972 until the same date in 2067, at which time all state 
protection for such recordings will cease to exist.39  This section 
also explicitly states that, despite the expiration of state 
protections for pre-1972 sound recordings in 2067, no such 
recording “shall be subject to copyright under this title before, 
on, or after February 15, 2067.”40  This period of 95 years is 
equivalent to the duration of protection that would have been 
afforded such works under the Copyright Act had they been 
initially fixed on the effective date of the 1971 amendments.41 
 
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act contains “safe 
harbor” provisions that protect certain categories of internet 
service providers who would otherwise be subject to liability for 
copyright infringement relating to post-1972 recordings posted 
on their networks by users.42  While the safe harbor provision 
 
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether 
created before or after that date and whether published or 
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.  
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or 
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or 
statutes of any State. . . . 
(c) With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 
1972, any rights or remedies under the common law or 
statutes of any state shall not be annulled or limited by this 
title until February 15, 2067.  The preemptive provisions of 
subsection (a) shall apply to any such rights and remedies 
pertaining to any cause of action arising from undertakings 
commenced on and after February 15, 2067.  
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 303, no sound 
recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to 




39. See id. § 301(a). 
40. See id. § 301(c). 
41. Id. § 303. 
42. Id. § 512.  This “safe harbor” provision, found in subsection (a), states 
that, if certain conditions regarding the manner in which copyrighted material 
is transmitted and/or stored are met: 
9
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does not apply to satellite radio services such as Sirius XM, its 
treatment in courts is instructive with regard to the manner in 
which state-law-based property rights to pre-1972 sound 
recordings may be enforced.  In New York, the Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division has held that the safe harbor provision does 
not preclude the assertion of a common-law copyright claim.43  
This holding stands as an explicit contradiction of a prior holding 
in a federal court in New York, which ruled that the DMCA was 
not affected by section 301(c) of the Copyright Act and thus could 
be read as precluding a common-law copyright claim against a 
qualifying service provider.44 
 
 
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, 
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other 
equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the 
provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, 
material through a system or network controlled or operated 
by or for the service provider, or by reason of the intermediate 
and transient storage of that material in the course of such 
transmitting, routing, or providing connections . . . . 
 
Id. § 512(a). 
43. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d 
106 (App. Div. 2013), which reads, in relevant part: 
 
Congress explicitly, and very clearly, separated the universe 
of sound recordings into two categories, one for works ‘fixed’ 
after February 15, 1972, to which it granted federal copyright 
protection, and one for those fixed before that date, to which 
it did not.  Defendant has pointed to nothing in the Copyright 
Act or its legislative history which prevents us from 
concluding that Congress meant to apply the DMCA to the 
former category, but not the latter. 
 
 Id. at 111. 
44. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), which reads, in relevant part: 
 
Read in context, section 301(c) is an anti-preemption 
provision ensuring that the grant of federal copyright 
protection did not interfere with common law or state rights 
established prior to 1972.  But section 301(c) does not prohibit 
all subsequent regulation of pre-1972 recordings. . . .  The 
plain meaning of the DMCA’s safe harbors, read in light of 
their purpose, covers both state and federal copyright claims.  
Thus, the DMCA applies to sound recordings fixed prior to 
February 15, 1972. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
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The analysis employed by the Appellate Division in Escape 
Media Group is both logical and thorough.  The court reasoned 
that the safe harbor provision of the DMCA must be read and 
interpreted in light of section 301(c) of the Copyright Act.45  As 
such, the court noted, interpreting the DMCA as applying to 
sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972 would entail 
“an implicit modification of the plain language of section 
301(c).”46  Section 301(c) states, “With respect to sound 
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or 
remedies under the common law or statutes of any state shall 
not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 
2067.”47  As the court astutely recognized, allowing the DMCA 
to bar actions for infringement on an owner’s rights to a pre-1972 
sound recording would in fact be (at least) a limitation of those 
rights, and “[a]ny material limitation, especially the elimination 
of the right to assert a common-law infringement claim, is 
violative of section 301(c) of the Copyright Act.”48 
Additionally, the court in Escape Media Group discussed 
(but did not opine as to the authoritative effect of) a report from 
the Copyright Office to the House of Representatives 
“recommending that Congress extend federal copyright 
protection to sound recordings fixed on or before February 15, 
1972, and that the safe harbor provisions of § 512 be applicable 
to such recordings.”49  As noted by the court, “the report took the 
position that Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes was wrongly 
decided and that congressional action was necessary before pre-
1972 recordings were embraced by the DMCA.”50  This report 
bases its recommendation on the principle “that bringing pre-
1972 sound recordings into the federal copyright system serves 
the interests of consistency and certainty . . .” as “there are a 
variety of legal regimes governing protection of pre-1972 sound 
 
 
Id. at 641-42. 
45. See Escape Media Group, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 111. 
46. Id. 
47. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012). 
48. Escape Media Group, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 111. 
49. Id. at 109-12 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS (2011), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf). 
50. Id. at 109. 
11
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recordings in the various states, and the scope of protection and 
of exceptions and limitations to that protection is unclear.”51  
Indeed, if pre-1972 sound recordings are afforded federal 
copyright protection, much litigation will be avoided and the 
process of securing broadcast rights to such recordings will be 
greatly simplified, to the substantial benefit of copyright owners, 
radio services, and the public generally.52 
 
C. The Copyright Royalty Board 
 
The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) is “a panel of federal 
judges that regulates some forms of licensing.”53  Under the 
Copyright Act, satellite digital audio radio services (SDARS) like 
Sirius XM Radio need not negotiate licenses with individual 
copyright owners; instead, the Act affords such services a 
statutory license for which the service must pay a fee.54  The 
CRB periodically promulgates regulations that establish the 
royalties that statutory license holders must pay.55  “The CRB 
has designated SoundExchange as the sole entity in the United 
States to collect digital performance royalties from statutory 
license users and to distribute those royalties to performing 
artists and copyright owners.”56  The regulations promulgated 
by the CRB regarding calculation and payment of statutory 
royalties are directly at issue in one of the current lawsuits 





51. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 49. 
52. See infra Part VI. 
53. Sisario, supra note 4. 
54. Complaint ¶¶ 13-14, SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 
No. 1:13CV01290 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 26, 2013) [hereinafter SoundExchange v. 
Sirius XM Complaint]; see 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2) (2012). 
55. See SoundExchange v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 54, at ¶ 2. 
56. Id. ¶ 10. 
57. See infra Part V.  The plaintiffs in the SoundExchange case allege that 
Sirius XM has improperly reduced the revenue base against which it calculates 
royalties owed to SoundExchange according to the regulations promulgated by 
the CRB.  See SoundExchange v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 54, at ¶¶ 
42-47. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
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IV. California’s Protection of Property Rights in Pre-1972 
Sound Recordings 
 
California has traditionally protected property rights, both 
via statute and at common law, to sound recordings fixed prior 
to February 15, 1972.58  California courts have long recognized 
that the separation in the federal Copyright Act of sound 
recordings from musical compositions allows states to protect 
those examples of the former, fixed prior to February 15, 1972, 
that are not within the scope of federal protection.59  California 
has codified its longstanding common-law protection of property 
rights to sound recordings.60  It is settled policy in California that 
 
58. See Capital Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 1 (“For 
over 40 years, sound recordings have been protected by California common law, 
and for over 30 years they have been provided protection under Section 980 of 
the California Civil Code.”). 
59. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 142 Cal. Rptr. 390 (Ct. App. 
1977), which reads, in relevant part: 
 
A recorded performance embodies two distinct bundles of 
legal rights: (1) rights in the musical composition itself, the 
tune and lyrics, and (2) rights in the recording “fixing” the 
performance of that musical composition.  Recorded 
performances, however, cannot legally exist without the right 
to reproduce mechanically the underlying musical 
compositions. Early in this century it was recognized that if 
composers had an unlimited right to control the “mechanical 
reproduction” of musical compositions there was a danger of 
“establishing a great musical monopoly” in the mechanical 
reproduction of music.  Congress therefore incorporated into 
the 1909 Copyright Act a comprehensive plan to recognize 
the rights of composers yet “prevent the establishment of a 
great trade monopoly.”  A key element of this plan is the 
compulsory licensing provision. 
 
Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted). 
60. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 980 (1984).  This section reads, in relevant part: 
 
(a) . . . (2) The author of an original work of authorship 
consisting of a sound recording initially fixed prior to 
February 15, 1972, has an exclusive ownership therein until 
February 15, 2047, as against all persons except one who 
independently makes or duplicates another sound recording 
that does not directly or indirectly recapture the actual 
sounds fixed in such prior sound recording, but consists 
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even 
13
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the need to foster “invention and free competition” necessitates 
legal protection of the ownership interest in sound recordings.61 
 
A. The Copyright Act and Preemption 
 
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that 
the individual states remain free to regulate the copying of pre-
1972 sound recordings as they see fit, drawing a distinction 
between the copyright realm and that of patents, in which 
federal law preempts contrary state statutes.62  The distinction, 
for Supremacy Clause purposes, appears to derive from the 
nature and purpose of federal protection: 
 
In regard to mechanical configurations, Congress 
had balanced the need to encourage innovation 
and originality of invention against the need to 
insure competition in the sale of identical or 
substantially identical products.  The standards 
established for granting federal patent protection 
to machines thus indicated not only which articles 
in this category Congress wished to protect, but 
which configurations it wished to remain free.  
The application of state law in these cases to 
prevent the copying of articles which did not meet 
 
though such sounds imitate or simulate the sounds contained 
in the prior sound recording. 
 
Id. § 980(a)(2). 
61. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 
1969), which reads, in relevant part: 
 
It is reasonable to conclude that permitting such 
appropriation would discourage invention and free 
competition—and that those engaged in the recording 
industry would be inclined not to utilize their skill and 
efforts, and expend large amounts of money, in producing 
unique recordings, but would wait for a recording to be 
produced, and then duplicate it and sell it, at maximum profit 
and with minimum effort and expense. 
 
Id. at 806. 
62. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569-70 (1973). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
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the requirements for federal protection disturbed 
the careful balance which Congress had drawn 
and thereby necessarily gave way under the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.  No 
comparable conflict between state law and federal 
law arises in the case of recordings of musical 
performances.  In regard to this category of 
‘Writings,’ Congress has drawn no balance; 
rather, it has left the area unattended, and no 
reason exists why the State should not be free to 
act.63 
 
Congress saw fit to protect certain types of products with patent 
law, to the exclusion of state protection of other types, while the 
Copyright Act protects products of the same type differently 
depending on the date of production, leaving the door open for 
the states to extend protection to the same type of product 
regardless of the date of production.64 
Courts in California have found that Civil Code Section 
980(a)(1) fits within the federal scheme of allowing state 
protections that do not conflict with the Copyright Act.  “The 
Supreme Court has held that states retain concurrent power 
under the Copyright Clause of the Constitution to afford 
copyright protection to the works of authors as long as such 
protection does not conflict with federal law.”65  “Thus, state laws 
are subject to federal preemption only if they create ‘legal or 
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive 
rights’ within the general scope of federal copyright law.”66  
These courts have employed a two-part test utilized by the Ninth 
Circuit to determine whether state protection is preempted by 
the Copyright Act.67  “Preemption occurs when: (1) the work at 




65. Trenton v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416, 1422-23 (C.D. Cal. 
1994) (citing Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546) (finding “not fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression” language in CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) “provides 
copyright protection outside the scope of that found in the federal statute”). 
66. Id. at 1423 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012)). 
67. Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 
2000). 
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rights granted under state law are ‘equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright’ set forth 
in the Act.”68  Like subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not 
conflict with the Copyright Act. 
While the second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test 
states that, in order to avoid preemption, the state claim must 
contain an “extra element,”69 this prong comes into play only if 
subsection (a)(2) does not provide “protection outside the scope 
of that found in the federal statute.”70  As in the case of 
subsection (a)(1), the plain language of subsection (a)(2) places 
the protection offered by the statute outside the scope of the 
federal Copyright Act.  While the Copyright Act protects only 
sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972, Civil Code 
Section 980(a)(2) protects the “exclusive ownership” right of 
“[t]he author of an original work of authorship consisting of a 
sound recording initially fixed prior to February 15, 1972 . . . .”71  
As an aside, by the language of this test, subsection (a)(2) may 
(if extended) arguably continue to offer protection outside the 
scope of the Copyright Act even after February 15, 2067, the date 
on which the Act extinguishes all previously-enjoyed state 
common-law and statutory protections for pre-1972 sound 
recordings.72  The continued validity (or lack thereof) of this test 
after 2067, however, is irrelevant to the current litigation and 
therefore outside the scope of this article.  For the purposes of 
this discussion, the federal statute can be viewed as a mere 
acknowledgement that state protections for pre-1972 sound 
recordings are indeed outside the scope of federal copyright 
protection and therefore not subject to preemption. 
 
B. Defining Publication – Does it Matter? 
 
As observed above, when Congress initially amended the 
Copyright Act, it failed to include a definition of the act of 
“publication,” which was seen as the act “which divested 
 
68. Id. (quoting Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 
973, 976 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
69. Id. 
70. Trenton, 865 F. Supp. at 1423. 
71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2) (West 2014). 
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
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common law rights” as far back as 1834.73  In California, as in 
other states, this ambiguity found its way to the forefront of 
much litigation.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, applying California law, ruled in 1995 that 
publication occurred, and common-law protection ceased, when 
the owner of a recording sold copies of that recording.74  This 
decision stood in contrast to earlier rulings by the Second Circuit 
that sale of recordings did not constitute publication,75 which 
contradicted a previous ruling by the same court that sale of 
recordings did in fact constitute publication.76 
Faced with the multitude of interpretations of what did and 
did not constitute publication, Congress amended the Copyright 
Act once again in 1997, adopting the rationale of the more recent 
Second Circuit cases at least for some recordings, depending on 
when they were sold to the public.77  The Ninth Circuit then 
revisited the issue, recognizing that “‘the result of our holding in 
La Cienega has been subsequently changed by Congress’ 
passage and enactment of [the amendment].’”78  In passing and 
enacting this amendment, Congress recognized a strong interest 
in establishing uniform standards in this area of law: 
“‘overturning the La Cienega decision will restore national 
uniformity on this important issue by confirming the wisdom of 
the custom and usage of the affected industries and of the 
Copyright Office for nearly 100 years.’”79 
The issue of publication, while important under state laws 
to determine whether the owner of a recording has abandoned 
his or her common-law rights, does not factor into the 
 
73. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 257-58 
(2005); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
74. La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 1995). 
75. Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955); 
see Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), 
aff’d per curiam, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976). 
76. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940). 
77. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2012) (“[D]istribution before January 1, 1978, of a 
phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute a publication of any musical 
work . . . embodied therein.”). 
78. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Batjac Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223, 
1235 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
79. Id. at 690 (quoting 143 Cong. Rec. S11301 (1997) (statement of 
Senator Hatch)). 
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determination of whether state copyright protection for pre-1972 
sound recordings is preempted by federal law.80  One may 
wonder, then, why the issue of publication must be passed upon 
at all in a discussion of the validity of state protection for pre-
1972 recordings.  It is precisely that need for national uniformity 
touted by Congress in the passage of its 1997 amendment that 
makes this issue material to any discussion of property rights in 
pre-1972 sound recordings.  With each state individually left to 
decide what protections (if any) to offer to owners of pre-1972 
sound recordings and what acts (if any) by those owners 
terminate those protections, it is no wonder that the issue of the 
rights of owners of pre-1972 recordings is far from settled.   
 
V. The Lawsuits: Is Sirius XM Doomed? 
 
A. SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. and the 
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction 
 
Plaintiff SoundExchange is “an independent nonprofit 
organization” designated by the CRB “as the sole entity in the 
United States to collect digital performance royalties from 
statutory license users and to distribute those royalties to 
performing artists and copyright owners.”81  SoundExchange 
alleges four separate counts in its complaint.82  Counts two and 
three, which allege underpayment of royalties based on 
exclusion of revenue from certain subscription packages,83 and 
count four, which alleges failure to make late fee payments,84 are 
outside the scope of this article.  Count one, though, alleges 
“Violation of 37 C.F.R. § 382.13(a) and 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(B) – 
Underpayment Based on Reduction of Revenue Purportedly 
Corresponding to Use of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings[,]”85 placing 
the lawsuit squarely within the framework of this discussion. 
Under the Copyright Act, users of the statutory license86 are 
 
80. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.06(B) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012)). 
81. SoundExchange v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 54, at ¶ 10. 
82. Id. ¶¶ 42-63. 
83. Id. ¶¶ 48-59. 
84. Id. ¶¶ 60-63. 
85. Id. ¶¶ 42-47. 
86. 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2) (2012). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
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required to pay royalties to copyright owners at a rate set 
periodically by the CRB.87  “The . . . rates and terms determined 
by the Copyright Royalty Judges shall . . . be binding on all 
copyright owners of sound recordings and entities performing 
sound recordings affected by this paragraph . . . .”88  This section 
also includes an opt-out clause that allows copyright owners and 
those who perform sound recordings to negotiate their own 
licensing agreements.89  Since Sirius XM has taken advantage of 
the statutory license and does not negotiate individual licensing 
agreements, it is required to pay royalties to SoundExchange at 
the rate set by the CRB for its use of all covered sound 
recordings.90  The issue that must be resolved, then, is whether 
that category of recordings for which Sirius XM must pay 
royalties includes pre-1972 sound recordings or, stated more 
precisely, whether Sirius XM may lawfully reduce its royalty 
payments for revenues purportedly connected to the 
performance of such recordings. 
Counsel for SoundExchange took care in its complaint not 
to allege that the pre-1972 sound recordings in question are 
protected by federal copyright, a wise move considering that the 
Copyright Act plainly excludes such recordings from federal 
protection91 and its statutory licensing provisions can 
reasonably be read to apply only to recordings protected by 
federal copyright.92  Instead, SoundExchange relies on language 
in the regulations promulgated by the CRB to bolster its claim 
that Sirius XM did not properly exclude pre-1972 recordings 
from its calculation of royalty payments.93  The crux of 
SoundExchange’s first cause of action is the claim that Sirius 
XM has been improperly applying to its calculation an exclusion 
 
87. Id. § 114(f)(1)(B). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. § 114(f)(3) (“License agreements voluntarily negotiated at any time 
between 1 or more copyright owners of sound recordings and 1 or more entities 
performing sound recordings shall be given effect in lieu of any decision by the 
Librarian of Congress or determination by the Copyright Royalty Judges.”). 
90. Id. § 114(f)(1)(B). 
91. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 260 (N.Y. 
2005) (citing Pub. L. 92-140 § 3 (1971)). 
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2), (f)(1)(B) (2012). 
93. See SoundExchange v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 54, at ¶¶ 16-
24. 
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not recognized as legitimate under the regulations promulgated 
by the CRB.94 
Under the scheme of statutory license and royalty payments 
administered by the CRB, “Sirius XM’s payments to 
SoundExchange are calculated as a percentage of Sirius XM’s 
Gross Revenues, a term defined in 37 C.F.R. § 382.11.”95  As 
alleged by the plaintiff, “[n]one of the regulatory exclusions in 
effect during the relevant time period permitted Sirius XM to 
reduce its reported Gross Revenues by an amount purportedly 
attributable to its performances of pre-1972 sound recordings.”96 
The plaintiffs allege, and Sirius XM does not dispute, that 
during the relevant period (2007-2012) Sirius XM “had reduced 
its reported Gross Revenues by between 10% and 15% of its 
subscription revenue on the theory that it corresponded to 
performances of pre-1972 sound recordings.”97  According to the 
CRB, “[t]he current Gross Revenues definition does not 
expressly recognize such an exclusion, which is not surprising 
given that there is no revenue recognition for the performance of 
pre-1972 works.”98  The CRB did acknowledge that reduction of 
royalty payments for pre-1972 recordings may be appropriate 
moving forward, prescribing a method of calculation quite 
different from that employed by Sirius XM: 
 
94. Id. ¶¶ 21-24. 
95. Id. ¶ 44; see 37 C.F.R. § 382.11 (2015), which reads, in relevant part: 
 
(1) Gross Revenues . . . shall be comprised of the following: 
(i) Subscription revenue recognized by Licensee directly from 
U.S. subscribers for Licensee’s SDARS . . . 
(3) Gross Revenues shall exclude: . . . 
(vi) Revenues recognized by Licensee for the provision of . . . 
(D) Channels, programming, products and/or other services 
for which the performance of sound recordings . . . is exempt 
from any license requirement or is separately licensed, 
including by a statutory license . . . . 
 
Id. 
96. SoundExchange v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 54, at ¶ 21. 
97. Id. ¶ 23 (citing Determination of Rates and Terms of Preexisting 
Subscription Services and Satelite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 
23,054, 23,080 (Apr. 17, 2013)). 
98. Determination of Rates and Terms of Preexisting Subscription 
Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,054, 
23,073 (Apr. 17, 2013). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
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As with directly licensed works, pre-1972 
recordings are not licensed under the statutory 
royalty regime and should not factor into 
determining the statutory royalty obligation.  But, 
. . . revenue exclusion is not the proper means . . . 
Rather, the proper approach is to calculate a 
deduction from the total royalty obligation . . . . 
The question then becomes how to calculate the 
correct deduction. . . . To be allowable, a deduction 
for pre-1972 recordings must be precise and the 
methodology transparent. . . . To be eligible for a 
deduction of the Pre-1972 Recording Share, Sirius 
XM must, on a monthly basis, identify to 
SoundExchange by title and recording artist those 
recordings for which it is claiming the deduction.99 
 
Sirius XM filed a motion to dismiss this action pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to 
stay the action.100  Sirius XM argues essentially that the district 
court should either dismiss or stay the claim under the doctrine 
of primary jurisdiction.101  “That doctrine permits a court to 
‘refer’ actions to an administrative agency when the core 
questions raised in a lawsuit ‘require[] the resolution of issues 
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the 
special competence of an administrative body.’”102  Sirius XM 
argues that answering the questions presented in this case 
“requires an understanding of the proper interpretation and 
application of the CRB’s own regulations . . .” placing the issue 
“squarely within the scope and purposes of the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine . . . .”103 
In response to Sirius XM’s request that the district court 
 
99. Id. 
100. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius 
XM Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 16, 2013). 
101. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6, 
SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290 (D.D.C. filed 
Oct. 16, 2013). 
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apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, SoundExchange 
argues that the doctrine “has no application to the claims at 
issue.”104  The plaintiff points out that “courts have declined to 
refer matters to agencies where a case calls for the application 
of regulations that are unambiguous.”105  According to 
SoundExchange, this is the sort of function that occurs “in the 
vast majority of cases that fall ‘within the conventional 
competence of courts[,]’”106 and as such, this matter should not 
be referred back to the CRB for further interpretation of the 
pertinent regulations.  SoundExchange points to the CRB’s own 
language in support of its argument that, not only are the 
regulations in question unambiguous, but the CRB has already 
considered the issue of Sirius XM’s interpretation of those 
regulations and held the defendant’s revenue-reduction scheme 
to be improper.107  According to SoundExchange, “it has long 
been recognized that referral to an agency on primary 
jurisdiction grounds is improper where the relevant agency has 
already addressed the question at issue or otherwise clarified 
how its regulations should be applied in a given context.”108 
Counsel for Sirius XM counters with the argument that the 
regulations promulgated by the CRB “unambiguously” support 
their client’s nonpayment of royalties “for programming ‘exempt 
from any license requirement’ . . .” a category of programming 
that includes “performances of pre-1972 recordings . . . .”109  
Furthermore, Sirius XM states that the CRB “prescribed a 
method for calculating such exemptions . . . . that is nearly 
 
104. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, 
SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290 (D.D.C. filed 
Dec. 2, 2013). 
105. Id. at 8 (citing Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 778 
F.2d 1365, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
106. Id. (quoting United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 832, 
838 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
107. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Determination of Rates and Terms of Preexisting 
Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 
23,054, 23,073 (Apr. 17, 2013)). 
108. Id. at 8 (citing United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 
(1956)). 
109. Defendant’s Reply Memorandum in Further Support of its Motion to 
Dismiss at 1, SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290 
(D.D.C. filed Dec. 20, 2013) (quoting Determination of Rates and Terms of 
Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 
78 Fed. Reg. 23,054, 23,073 (Apr. 17, 2013)). 
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identical, both in approach and economic consequence, to the 
methodology utilized by Sirius XM for the period in dispute.”110  
According to Sirius XM, the claims made by SoundExchange are 
based “on a meritless accounting quibble . . .”111 and the essential 
dispute comes down to Sirius XM calculating its royalty 
payments using the same formula as that prescribed by the CRB 
with the numbers in a different order and thus reaching the 
same ultimate calculation.112 
Interestingly, what counsel for Sirius XM fails to address in 
either of its memoranda is the language of the CRB prescribing 
the method by which the service provider may properly calculate 
and obtain a deduction from its royalty obligation related to pre-
1972 sound recordings.113  The CRB stated that the method by 
which Sirius XM calculated such a deduction was both 
incomplete and improper.114  “To be allowable, a deduction . . . 
must be precise and the methodology transparent . . . . To be 
eligible for a deduction of the Pre-1972 Recording Share, Sirius 
XM must, on a monthly basis, identify to SoundExchange by title 
and recording artist those recordings for which it is claiming the 
deduction.”115 
What the CRB did not expressly determine was whether 
Sirius XM’s incorrect method resulted in actual underpayment 
of royalties.  Even if the CRB had made such a determination, 
though, SoundExchange would still need to turn to the court 
system to obtain a remedy.  As the plaintiffs outline in their 
memorandum, the CRB, which has no power to enforce the 
regulations it promulgates, “cannot award SoundExchange 
damages . . . . Rather, to obtain a damages award, 
SoundExchange would have to return to this Court.”116  In such 
 
110. Id. at 2. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 7 (“In short, Sirius XM’s approach . . . was mathematically 
equivalent to what the [CRB] made explicit . . . except that rather than 
multiplying A x B x C, the [CRB] determination calls for multiplying A x C x 
B. . . . [T]he economic results are substantively identical.”). 
113. See supra note 98, and accompanying text. 
114. Determination of Rates and Terms of Preexisting Subscription 
Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,054, 
23,073 (Apr. 17, 2013) (“[R]evenue exclusion is not the proper means . . . .”). 
115. Id. (emphasis added). 
116. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 104, at 16. 
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circumstances, SoundExchange argues, where the controversy 
falls “‘within the conventional competence of courts[,]’” 
application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not 
proper.117 
In a memorandum opinion filed August 26, 2014, United 
States District Judge Richard J. Leon granted Sirius XM’s 
motion and stayed the action pending a decision by the CRB.118  
As Judge Leon stated: 
 
It is true that the Satellite II panel set forth a 
different mechanism for dealing with pre-1972 
sound recordings than Sirius XM had used 
previously, but whether Sirius XM’s approach was 
improper such that it owes SoundExchange 
additional fees for times past is an open question 
of interpretation and policy.119 
 
Judge Leon noted that, if the CRB rules that Sirius XM did in 
fact reach an improper calculation of royalties, “SoundExchange 
can seek damages in this court.”120  The CRB, which has already 
determined that Sirius XM’s method of calculation was not 
proper, must now determine whether that method means Sirius 
XM owes Sound Exchange any additional royalties for the period 
in question. 
Sirius XM’s argument that its method of calculation will 
lead to “economic results [that] are substantively identical”121 to 
those that will be achieved by the method prescribed by the CRB 
may very well be sound.  This article takes no position on the 
accounting accuracy of the parties to this litigation.  Of course, 
if the pre-1972 sound recordings for which Sirius XM seeks a 
royalty reduction were included under the protections of the 
federal Copyright Act, their performance would be subject to the 
 
117. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 
832, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
118. Memorandum Opinion at 12, SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM 
Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 20, 2013). 
119. Id. at 10-11. 
120. Id. at 11. 
121. Defendant’s Reply Memorandum in Further Support of its Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 109, at 7. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6
   
1040 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:3 
statutory licensing scheme, and we would have no “accounting 
quibble”122 and, in all likelihood, this litigation would have been 
avoided altogether. 
 
B.  Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. 
 
The plaintiffs in the Capitol Records case (Capitol Records, 
Sony Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Warner Music 
Group, and ABKCO Music & Records) collectively “own the 
majority of commercially exploited recorded music in the United 
States[] . . . .”123  Among the artists whose pre-1972 recordings 
are owned by the plaintiffs are “the Beatles, the Beach Boys, the 
Rolling Stones, Bob Dylan, Jimi Hendrix, the Eagles, Led 
Zeppelin, the Temptations, the Supremes, Stevie Wonder, 
Buddy Holly, Chuck Berry, Marvin Gaye, Nat King Cole, Otis 
Redding, Aretha Franklin, Simon & Garfunkel, Patsy Cline, and 
Louis Armstrong.”124  The plaintiffs allege that Sirius XM 
“publicly performs thousands . . .” of their pre-1972 recordings 
each day and that the plaintiffs “have never authorized Sirius 
XM . . .” to do so.125  The plaintiffs claim five separate causes of 
action: violation of California Civil Code section 980(a)(2), 
common law misappropriation, statutory and common law 
unfair competition, conversion, and declaratory relief.126  It is 
the plaintiffs’ first cause of action, based on California’s 
statutory protection of ownership rights in pre-1972 sound 
recordings, that is central to this discussion. 
California Civil Code section 980(a)(2) provides an 
“exclusive ownership” right for the “author of an original work 
of authorship consisting of a sound recording initially fixed prior 
to February 15, 1972 . . . until February 15, 2047[] . . . .”127  The 
plaintiffs therefore claim that they “have all the exclusive rights 
to exploit those recordings, including, but not limited to, the 
rights to manufacture, copy, sell, distribute, broadcast, and 
publicly perform their Pre-72 Recordings, including by digital 
 
122. See id. at 2. 
123. Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 3-7, 10. 
124. Id. ¶ 10. 
125. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. 
126. Id. ¶¶ 29-56. 
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2) (West 2014). 
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transmission[]”128 and that “Defendants do not have the right to 
reproduce or publicly perform [Plaintiffs’] Pre-72 Recordings and 
have never compensated Plaintiffs for Defendants’ exploitation 
of their Pre-72 Recordings.”129  In addition to actual damages 
and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs seek to recover “exemplary 
and punitive damages” because “Defendants are guilty of 
oppression, fraud or malice[] . . . .”130 
The plaintiffs note that California’s protection of property 
rights in pre-1972 sound recordings is not identical to that 
initially offered to post-1972 recordings under the federal 
Copyright Act.131  As noted by the California Court of Appeal, 
Second District, Division 1, record companies “expend[] 
substantial effort, skill and money in selecting performing 
artists and obtaining the exclusive right to record their 
performances[] . . . .”132  As noted by the plaintiffs: 
 
[The] broad protection . . . is consistent with the 
recognition . . . of critical, important public policy 
interests . . . includ[ing] . . . ensuring that record 
companies receive compensation . . . as well as 
ensuring that the owners of sound recordings 
possess powerful . . . remedies against those who 
seek to unfairly appropriate and profit from such 
 
128. Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 30. 
129. Id. ¶ 31. 
130. Id. ¶ 34. 
131. Id. ¶ 24, which reads, in relevant part: 
 
Unlike the inclusive scope of protection afforded to Pre-
Recordings (sic) by California state law, Congress initially 
limited the federal sound recording copyright to include 
certain of the exclusive rights conferred on other works . . . 
and to exclude the right to publicly perform sound recordings.  
California law, by contrast, has never delimited, either 
expressly or implicitly, the scope of common law or statutory 
protection of Pre-72 Recordings, and did not exclude the right 
of public performance from the rights of “exclusive 
ownership’” in Pre-72 Recordings. 
 
Id. 
132. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1969). 
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artistic performances.133 
 
The interests touted by the plaintiffs are quite similar to those 
recognized by Congress when, in 1995, it granted to the owners 
of copyrighted sound recordings the exclusive right to broadcast 
such recordings.134 
Interestingly, the text of Civil Code Section 980(a)(2) does 
not contain language similar to that found in subsection (1) that 
seems to reserve such an exclusive performance right.  
Subsection (1) reserves “an exclusive ownership in the 
representation or expression . . .” of an “original work of 
authorship that is not fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression . . .” to the author of the work.135  Subsection (2), 
however, while reserving “an exclusive ownership” to “the 
author of an original work of authorship consisting of a sound 
recording initially fixed prior to February 15, 1972,” is written 
in more general terms and does not include the “representation 
or expression” qualifier found in subsection (1). 
Reading these two subsections together, as courts often will, 
one may reasonably come to the conclusion that the California 
legislature deliberately omitted the “representation or 
expression” language from subsection (2) with the intent of not 
reserving such an exclusive performance right for pre-1972 
sound recordings.  If the statute is to be interpreted in this 
manner, Sirius XM’s broadcasting of such recordings in 
California may not give rise to civil liability for infringement on 
the exclusive ownership right of the plaintiffs.  This reading of 
Section 980, however, would not be proper, for it would implicitly 
endorse the previously dispelled notion that the act of selling 
copies of such recordings constitutes “publication” and divests 
their owner of exclusive property rights.136  Following this 
analysis, the language of subsection (2) would seem to support 
the plaintiffs’ claim that Sirius XM’s broadcasting of the 
 
133. Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 25 (citing 
Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06). 
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012); H.R. Rep. No. 104-274 (1995). 
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
136. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Batjac Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223, 
1235 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Part IV.B., supra. 
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recordings in question without the plaintiffs’ permission is 
unlawful.  The plaintiffs point to the issues highlighted by 
Congress when it passed the Digital Performance Rights in 
Sound Recordings Act137 as evidence of the need to continue to 
recognize the exclusive ownership rights held under California 
law.138 
On September 23, 2014, the plaintiffs requested that the 
court take judicial notice of an order issued by Judge Philip S. 
Gutierrez of the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California in Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, 
Inc.139 in connection with the plaintiffs’ motion for jury 
instruction.140  The plaintiffs had previously requested that the 
court issue the following jury instruction: 
 
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012).  This section of the Copyright Act states 
that “the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . . in the case of sound 
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital 
audio transmission.”  Id. 
138. Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 27.  The 
plaintiffs quote at length from H.R. Rep. No. 104-274 (1995): 
 
Trends within the music industry, as well as the 
telecommunications and information services industries, 
suggest that digital transmission of sound recordings is likely 
to become a very important outlet for the performance of 
recorded music in the near future. . . . These new digital 
transmission technologies may permit consumers to enjoy 
performances of a broader range of higher-quality recordings 
than has ever before been possible. . . . However, in the 
absence of appropriate copyright protection in the digital 
environment, the creation of new sound recordings and 
musical works could be discouraged, ultimately denying the 
public some of the potential benefits of the new digital 
transmission technologies.  Current copyright law is 
inadequate to address all of the issues raised by these new 
technologies dealing with the digital transmission of sound 
recordings and musical works and, thus, to protect the 
livelihoods of the recording artists, songwriters, record 
companies, music publishers and others who depend upon 
revenues derived from traditional record sales. 
 
Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 27 (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-274 (1995)). 
139. No. 2:13CV05693 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 6, 2013). 
140. Court’s Ruling on Submitted Matter, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Jury 
Instruction, Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. BC520981 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2014). 
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The owner of a sound recording “fixed” (i.e., 
recorded) prior to February 15, 1972, possesses a 
property interest and exclusive ownership rights 
in that sound recording.  This property interest 
and the ownership rights under California law 
include the exclusive right to publicly perform, or 
authorize others to perform, the sound recording 
by means of digital transmission—whether by 
satellite transmission, over the Internet, through 
mobile smartphone applications, or otherwise.141 
 
After the plaintiffs’ motion for jury instruction in Capitol 
Records was argued and under submission, the court in Flo & 
Eddie issued an order granting summary judgment to the 
plaintiffs, ruling that the exclusive ownership right in a sound 
recording under Civil Code Section 980 includes a public 
performance right.142 
On October 14, 2014, California Superior Court Judge Mary 
H. Strobel, taking judicial notice of the summary judgment order 
in Flo & Eddie, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for jury 
instruction, ruling that Civil Code Section 980 does afford the 
owner of a sound recording an exclusive public performance 
right.143  Judge Strobel found “significant that the California 
legislature specifically adopted one exception to exclusive 
ownership for recording ‘covers’ found in federal copyright law, 
‘nearly word-for-word’ but did not specifically adopt the other 
exception found in that law for public performance rights.”144  
Judge Strobel thus concluded that the legislature intended this 
“cover” exception to be the only exception to Section 980’s 
exclusive ownership rights.  Since a public performance right 
was not “specifically excluded,” the court ruled that such a right 
is included in the exclusive ownership rights of pre-1972 sound 
recordings.145 
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Flo & Eddie.146  In light of the fact that the court in Capitol 
Records was persuaded to change its initial “tentative ruling” on 
the plaintiffs’ motion for jury instruction,147 a ruling on Sirius 
XM’s anticipated appeal in Flo & Eddie has the potential to 
significantly impact the progress of the litigation in the Capitol 
Records case.  In any event, the end of the recent flourish of 
litigation against Sirius XM for its use of pre-1972 sound 
recordings does not appear imminent. 
 
VI. Conclusion: The Ramifications of Enforcing Property Rights 
to Pre-1972 Recordings 
 
As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Goldstein, because a 
state’s copyright protection is effective only within the borders 
of that state, it is less valuable from an economic standpoint 
than federal protection, as residents may simply cross state lines 
to obtain copies of works that would be unlawful in their home 
state.  The Court, however, opined that this lesser value does not 
remove from states the power to offer whatever limited 
protection they can to sound recordings not protected by the 
Copyright Act: 
 
The interests of a State which grants copyright 
protection may . . . be adversely affected by other 
States that do not; individuals who wish to 
purchase a copy of a work protected in their own 
State will be able to buy unauthorized copies in 
other States where no protection exists.  However, 
this conflict is neither so inevitable nor so severe 
as to compel the conclusion, that state power has 
been relinquished to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Congress.  Obviously when some States do not 
grant copyright protection – and most do not – 
that circumstance reduces the economic value of a 
state copyright, but it will hardly render the 
 
146. See Ben Sisario, Sirius XM Loses Suit on Royalties for Oldies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2014, at B3. 
147. Court’s Ruling on Submitted Matter, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Jury 
Instruction, Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. BC520981 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2014). 
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copyright worthless.148 
 
Much has changed, though, in the many years since the 
Goldstein decision.  As pointed out by counsel for the plaintiffs 
in the Capitol Records case, “music consumption habits have 
changed, and greater numbers of people listen to music via 
digital radio channels in lieu of purchasing music on CDs or 
digital music files . . . .”149  It is this fundamental change in the 
way many of us consume this product that necessitates greater 
protection for the owners of pre-1972 sound recordings. 
While the wisdom of extinguishing all state protections for 
pre-1972 sound recordings in 2067150 is not central to this 
discussion, there is a greater consideration in play.  With the 
advent of new methods of music consumption, state protections 
are already considerably less valuable than they were in 1973 
when the Supreme Court in Goldstein acknowledged that state 
protections were of lesser economic value than that offered by 
the Copyright Act.151  Whereas a person who wished to consume 
unauthorized reproductions in 1973 had to travel to a state that 
did not offer copyright protection to sound recordings in order to 
do so, the same person today need only turn on his or her 
satellite radio.  If the transmissions received by that radio are 
protected only in some states and not in others, we will continue 
to see disputes arise between SDARS who argue they are only 
doing what the law allows, owners of sound recordings who 
argue they are only protecting their creations, investments, and 
sources of income, and consumers of music who stand to be the 
ultimate losers, whether due to increased subscription fees (if for 
nothing else than to cover the cost of litigation) or decreased 
access to some of the most popular music ever recorded. 
Bringing all sound recordings, regardless of the date on 
which they were originally fixed, under the wing of federal 
protection would go a long way toward alleviating those 
concerns.  As noted by the CRB, “pre-1972 recordings are not 
licensed under the statutory royalty regime . . . .”152  Thus, even 
 
148. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973). 
149. Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 13. 
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012). 
151. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 558. 
152. Determination of Rates and Terms of Preexisting Subscription 
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if state copyright protections are in place for such recordings, the 
owners of the recordings and SDARS are left with unattractive 
options: negotiate independent licensing/royalty agreements, 
continue to periodically litigate their differences, or remove the 
recordings from satellite radio broadcasts altogether.  Amending 
the Copyright Act to embrace all sound recordings would allow 
SDARS to take advantage of the ease and convenience of the 
statutory license, thereby eliminating the need to litigate issues 
of state-law-based rights and damages or spend time and other 
valuable resources negotiating licensing agreements with 
individual holders (or collectives thereof) of state-protected 
copyrights. 
When it endeavored to define for the first time the term 
“publication” for copyright purposes, Congress touted as a 
motivating force the need for consistency and “national 
uniformity” in the copyright realm.153  It is precisely this need 
for consistency that warrants amending the Copyright Act once 
more to eliminate the distinction between sound recordings fixed 
before February 15, 1972 and those fixed from that date forward.  
The Copyright Office, in fact, has cited specifically “the interests 
of consistency and certainty[] . . .” in recommending that “sound 
recordings made before February 15, 1972 be brought into the 
federal copyright regime.”154  The Copyright Office notes that, 
with pre-1972 recordings protected at the state level, “the scope 
of protection and of exceptions and limitations to that protection 
is unclear.”155 
Examples of the uncertainty bemoaned in the Copyright 
Office’s report abound in the current litigation against Sirius 
XM Radio.  The United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia recently stayed a case that, depending on one’s point 
of view, can in good faith be framed as either a “meritless 
accounting quibble”156 or a concerted scheme to systematically 
defraud a nonprofit organization tasked by the federal 
 
Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,054, 
23,073 (Apr. 17, 2013). 
153. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting 143 Cong. Rec. S11301 (1997) (statement of Senator Hatch)). 
154. Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/docs/sound/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
155. Id. 
156. See supra note 110. 
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government with the collection and distribution of royalty 
payments.  While the parties to the action are in substantial 
agreement as to what authority governs the controversy, each 
party has interpreted the language of that authority as 
unambiguous against its opponent.  The parties are unable even 
to agree as to what governing body should preside over the 
matter. 
Regrettably, resolution of this matter, whether by the CRB 
or the court in favor of one party or by extrajudicial settlement, 
is unlikely to curb future conflict.  A number of issues would 
remain to be determined in future litigation.  If Sirius XM must 
settle (or pay damages), is the Copyright Act’s distinction 
between sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972 and 
those fixed from that date forward essentially meaningless?  
Must the CRB expressly rule on each conflict, or could the courts 
become the exclusive forum for the resolution of royalty 
disputes?  If owners of pre-1972 sound recordings are unable to 
vindicate their claimed rights under federal regulations, do they 
then follow the lead of the plaintiffs in the Capitol Records case 
in asserting their claims under state laws?  The interplay 
between the issues in Capitol Records and the SoundExchange 
case will come to the forefront in the event that the plaintiffs are 
unable to prevail on their federal claims. 
On the opposite coast, the Superior Court of California, Los 
Angeles County finds itself in an equally unattractive position.  
California’s common-law and statutory protection of ownership 
rights in pre-1972 sound recordings is longstanding and does not 
conflict with the federal scheme of copyright protection.157  
Failure to enforce the rights claimed by the plaintiffs would 
upset decades of settled state law.  Conversely, by continuing to 
enforce such ownership rights, the court may open a virtual 
Pandora’s Box of consequences.  Would Sirius XM alter its 
broadcasting scheme to avoid making royalty payments?  If so, 
would the service suffer a substantial blow to its bottom line in 
the form of reduced subscribership?  If Sirius XM continued 
broadcasting such recordings and paid royalties, would not the 
cost of those royalties be passed along to its subscribers?  If so, 
would all subscribers have to pay, or only those who live in 
 
157. See supra Part IV. 
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California and other states with protections for owners of pre-
1972 sound recordings?  How fair would it be for Sirius XM to 
impose the costs associated with California’s state law and 
public policy on subscribers in other states? 
Fortunately, confrontation of the myriad issues that would 
be left unsettled even after resolution of the lawsuits discussed 
herein need not be left to the many state and federal courts.  
These issues can be substantially resolved (avoided?) by 
amending the federal Copyright Act to include protection for 
sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972.  As noted by 
the Copyright Office, “[b]ringing pre-1972 sound recordings into 
the federal copyright system completes the work Congress began 
in 1976 when it brought most works protected by state common 
law copyright into the federal statutory scheme.”158  Ironically, 
the Copyright Office has expressed some confusion as to why 
Congress did not include all such works under the federal 
scheme in the first instance.159 
In light of the potential for extensive future uncertainty if 
the current federal copyright scheme for sound recordings 
remains intact, the potential for such uncertainty to be avoided 
by adopting the recommendations of the Copyright Office, and 
Congress’ “articulated goal of a unitary system of copyright,”160 
a further amendment of the Copyright Act to extend federal 






158. Federal Copyright Protection, supra note 154. 
159.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-
1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 17 (2011), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf (“It is apparent from 
the legislative reports concerning the Sound Recording Amendment and the 
1976 Copyright Act that Congress well understood it was leaving in place the 
state law regime for pre-1972 sound recordings, rather than bringing them 
under federal law.  However, nowhere does Congress explain the 
considerations that, in its view, supported this result.  This omission is 
particularly curious in light of Congress’s articulated goal of a unitary system 
of copyright and its decision to implement that goal by bringing essentially all 
other works protected by state law copyright regimes into the federal system.”). 
160. Id. 
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